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I. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF A WAR OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
The world will little note, nor long remember, what academics
say about the Constitution. That is, probably, as it should be. The law
is made-its interpretation settled-by great events, not law review
articles; by wars, not words; by presidents, not professors.
The Constitution we have today is in substantial measure the re-
sult of the single most decisive legal interpretive event of American
history: the Civil War. The outcome of Grant v Lee resolved the most
important issue of antebellum constitutional dispute-the nature of
the Union-in favor of the nationalist view of sovereignty and
against the South's state-sovereignty view. It was a great Civil War,
not a judicial opinion, that settled this issue. It was likewise the Civil
War, not any correcting judicial decision, that reversed the most egre-
gious error of the Supreme Court up to that point in our history-
Dred Scott's' enshrinement of slavery as a fundamental constitutional
property right of (white) citizens, immune from federal interference
as a matter of "due process" of law. And it was the War, not any judi-
cial decision, that reversed the most egregious error of the framers in
t Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School;Visiting Profes-
sor of Law (2003-2004), University of St. Thomas School of Law. My thanks to John Nagle and
Saikrishna Prakash for comments on earlier drafts of this Review. The reader should note that
Dan Farber and I have been faculty colleagues and friends for thirteen years. Both his book and
this Review grew out of our co-taught seminar on "Lincoln and the Constitution" at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School and the wonderful debates and discussions we enjoyed with each
other and our students during those years. Dan got his book written first; I graded the seminar pa-
pers. (Shows you who's the smarter one.) As this goes to press, Dan is leaving Minnesota for
someplace warmer. I thank him for his years as a great colleague, friend, mentor, and sounding
board. And I repay him with this withering attack on his book.
I Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857).
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preserving and protecting slavery (to a considerable degree) in the
first place.
The War worked a fundamental transformation in the legal
status of slavery under the U.S. Constitution, and it defined (some
would say redefined) American federalism. It did so by repudiating
the South's and the Supreme Court's misappropriations of the Con-
stitution, and also by providing the crucible for a constitutional ref-
ormation of the document itself. The result was the Union we have
today and the end of slavery throughout that more perfect union. The
War vindicated the North's interpretation of the original Constitu-
tion, rejecting state sovereignty and embracing instead national gov-
ernment authority to guarantee to the citizens of each state genuinely
republican government and to every individual citizen both freedom
and the privileges and immunities of equal citizenship. The Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution
were a great national interpretation and implementation of the Re-
publican Form of Government and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of Article IV of the Constitution, and a repudiation of the
Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott-major interpretive victories
won in a bloody civil war fought over constitutional meaning.
None of this would have happened if President Abraham Lin-
coln had not believed himself constitutionally compelled-required,
in his view, by an "oath registered in heaven" 2-to insist on his under-
standing of the Constitution in the teeth of the competing claims of
the South and of the Supreme Court, even though doing so might
mean civil war. Lincoln was the Commander-in-Chief of this great
war over constitutional meaning, and both his interpretive method
and his stance toward competing views were striking. Lincoln was
what we today might call a pragmatic textualist in matters of constitu-
tional interpretation. The Constitution means what the words say, in
their most natural and literal sense (while allowing for both context
and specialized usage). At the same time, the Constitution must be
read as a whole, and read sensibly and reasonably in light of the pur-
poses it was designed to serve. Thus, particular phrases should not be
read so as to defeat the basic enterprise of constitutional government.
For Lincoln, his duty as President was controlled by such a fair and
reasonable (and non-self-destructive) reading of the Constitution's
text-chiefly because the Constitution seems to say, in the Presiden-
tial Oath Clause, that that is the President's duty. And, Lincoln be-
lieved, that sworn presidential duty cannot be abandoned or com-
promised because of the misguided and destructive views of other
2 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar 4, 1861), in Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed,
Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 215,224 (Library of America 1989).
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constitutional actors. Lincoln thus set himself against any attempt to
subordinate the nation's Constitution (as he understood it) to the pe-
culiar views of individual states, or even to the decisions of the Su-
preme Court, when such views were destructive to the nation whose
Constitution he had sworn to "preserve, protect and defend."'
Given the centrality of Lincoln and the Civil War to the constitu-
tional order we have today, it is little short of incredible how little at-
tention modern scholarship pays to the Civil War as an event of con-
stitutional interpretation or to Lincoln as a constitutional interpreter.
In part, this neglect is a byproduct of the Langdellian "case" method
of teaching and study, with its reliance on written judicial opinions
producing the occupational habit (and hazard) of thinking of the law
solely in terms of such opinions. But this cannot be a sufficient ex-
planation. The constitutional issues framed by the Civil War provide
excellent case studies appropriate to the case method, and Lincoln
produced great legal texts worthy of study alongside the most classic
of judicial opinions. The neglect might, in part, be more ideological.
Courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are not the heroes of this
story, but the villains. The actions of the judiciary are embarrassing,
and such embarrassment is not in keeping with the dominant modern
paradigm of constitutional law, which casts courts as heroes and po-
litical actors as villains. Moreover, the actions of President Lincoln
defied judicial supremacy, sometimes bordered on authoritarian, and
occasionally sacrificed individual liberty on the altar of necessity,
emergency, and national survival-also themes out of favor among
most modern constitutional scholars.
Or the neglect might simply reflect the passage of time. The is-
sues of nearly a century and a half ago are not-or at least are not
all-the specific issues of today. Constitutional scholarship today
tends to focus on yesterday's Supreme Court decision and tomor-
row's pending case, ignoring, to our detriment, the more fundamental
shaping of the Constitution through great historical events in favor of
the study of the latest doctrinal ripples in Supreme Court decisions of
middling importance.
Whatever the reason for the neglect of Lincoln and the Civil
War, Professor Dan Farber has stepped into the void to correct it,
with a learned, subtle book about the constitutional controversies of
Lincoln's time. Lincoln's Constitution should be much noted and long
remembered. It deserves a wide audience-wider, probably, than it
3 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 8.
4 When once before I made oblique reference, with irony, to the "case" of Grant v Lee
(Appomattox Court House 1865) in a footnote to an academic article, the law review editors
asked me to provide a case reporter citation, as they had not been able to find it on Westlaw or
Lexis.
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will receive -as an academic and at times (as the author himself con-
cedes) "a bit abstruse" (pp 26, 184) treatment of its topics. Professor
Farber's insights are unfailingly intriguing (even when his conclusions
are debatable) on such topics as interposition, secession, war powers,
emancipation, and suppression of civil liberties in time of war. Some
of these topics are no longer matters of current constitutional contro-
versy. Others, like war powers and civil liberties, are unexpectedly
central to the constitutional life of the nation today. All are critical to
understanding the Constitution we have today, and Farber's book
does a great service in bringing to this undeservedly ignored and un-
deniably important period of constitutional history both the attention
it merits and his considerable insight into it.
In Part II of this Review, I sketch Farber's project, praise its gen-
eral excellence, and note its limitations. As excellent as the book is,
Farber more than occasionally falls victim to modern constitutional
conceptions and prejudices favoring reflexive nationalism and un-
questioning acceptance of judicial supremacy in constitutional inter-
pretation-conceptions and prejudices not shared by Lincoln-with
the consequence that Lincoln's Constitution is sometimes Farber's
Constitution, more than it truly is Lincoln's.
In Parts III through V, I address three large constitutional ques-
tions framed by Lincoln and the Civil War, building on Farber's dis-
cussion and taking issue with certain of his conclusions. The first
question (Part III) concerns the notions of interposition, nullification,
and secession: does a state properly possess an independent power of
constitutional interpretation and, if so, does that permit secession as a
remedy for a perceived violation of the Constitution by the national
government? The correct answer, I submit, is Lincoln's (not Farber's):
no state has a unilateral constitutional right to secede that the nation
as a whole is bound to honor. But that does not mean that a state
might not possess, in theory and in propriety, the right to resist, with
the powers at its disposal, a very serious breach of the Constitution
by the national government. Lincoln never argues any differently.
Rather, Lincoln's consistent position was that, on the merits, the
South simply did not have a legitimate case that such a violation of
the Constitution had occurred in fact by virtue of Lincoln's election
and his constitutional views with respect to slavery and the
(un)authoritative status of Dred Scott as binding law for the nation.
Farber's Lincoln is too strongly nationalist on the question of state
interpretive power, looking more like the elderly James Madison or
Daniel Webster (or like Farber himself). The real Lincoln was more
concerned with whether the South's constitutional interpretations
were correct or not.
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The second question (Part IV) builds on the discussion of the
first and is framed by the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott and
Lincoln's response to it as a candidate for Senate in 1858, as a candi-
date for President in 1860, and as President during the Civil War: are
the federal judiciary's interpretations of the Constitution authorita-
tive and binding on all other actors in our constitutional system? Lin-
coln's answer was a reluctant, at times inconsistent, but increasingly
definite, No -a point with which Farber, a committed modern judicial
supremacist, has considerable difficulty. Farber ends up uncomforta-
bly defending a presidential duty to follow Dred Scott and to obey
judicial decrees even where they are hideously wrong and even
where they might threaten the continued existence of the Union.
Again, I side with Lincoln against Farber: the President's duty to the
Constitution does not permit him (much less require him) to sacrifice
the Constitution, or the nation whose Constitution it is, to the wrong-
headed views of the Supreme Court.
The third question (Part V) is as vital today as it was in Lincoln's
day. In Lincoln's words, "Must a government, of necessity, be too
strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its
own existence?"' Farber chooses the traditional liberal horn of the di-
lemma, coming down on the side of civil liberty but generally not
judging Lincoln too harshly on this score. Again, I prefer to defend
Lincoln's view on its own terms: for Lincoln, the imperative constitu-
tional duty of the President to "preserve, protect and defend" the na-
tion whose Constitution it is, operated as a meta-principle of constitu-
tional interpretation, affecting how every other provision should be
interpreted. This is a remarkable, even extraordinary-and eminently
defensible -view, and one with implications as important for the
world after September 11, 2001 as for the world after April 12, 1861.
II. FARBER'S CONSTITUTION AND FARBER'S LINCOLN
Lincoln's Constitution is an outstanding book-brimming with
insights, scholarly but unpretentious, readable and entertaining, even
charming at times. It is in every respect a greatly satisfying work. The
fact that I disagree with some of its points, or would have emphasized
some points far more and others far less, does not detract from the
book's excellence. It merely says that not everyone would have cho-
sen to write the same book in the same way.
Farber's treatment of the constitutional issues surrounding the
Lincoln presidency hits essentially all of the relevant themes: the con-
stitutionality of secession (Chapters 1 and 4), in light of competing
5 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in Fehrenbacher,
ed, Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 246,250 (cited in note 2).
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antebellum notions of state-versus-national sovereignty (Chapter 2),
including early Supreme Court decisions touching such themes
(Chapter 3); the constitutional power of the federal government to
act to coerce the South to remain in the United States (Chapter 5),
and of the President to act on his own initiative in this regard, pursu-
ant to broad notions of "executive power" to enforce the laws and
equally broad notions of presidential power as "Commander in
Chief" of the nation's military (Chapter 6); the violations of individ-
ual liberty and freedom of speech during the Civil War crisis (Chap-
ter 7); and broader philosophical questions about emergency and the
viability of "The Rule of Law in Dark Times" (Chapter 8). Other top-
ics might have been included, but nothing momentous has been left
out. In just two hundred pages of text, Farber has covered what is of
critical importance.
With one pretty major exception: slavery and Dred Scott. Where
is the chapter on Lincoln's constitutional views about slavery and na-
tional (and state) power to contain it? Where is the chapter on Dred
Scott-one of the most notorious and atrocious Supreme Court deci-
sions of all time, the key to understanding Lincoln's rejection of com-
plete judicial supremacy, the central theme of the Lincoln-Douglas
debates and Lincoln's unsuccessful Senate candidacy in 1858, and the
issue that propelled him to national attention, the Republican nomi-
nation, and election to the presidency in 1860?
Of course, slavery and Dred Scott come up in Farber's discussion,
but mostly as accompaniments to other motifs, never the main theme.
They are reasons for the secession crisis, part of the background of
North-South tensions. Dred Scott is discussed, first, briefly, as a "disas-
trous miscalculation" (p 10) that exacerbated the sectional crisis lead-
ing to Civil War. Then, much later, Dred Scott reappears as part of the
last chapter on "The Rule of Law in Dark Times" (pp 177-88), as an
illustration of (and explanation for) Lincoln's drift away from the
rule of law and the obligation to follow judicial authority. (As I dis-
cuss below, for Farber, the "rule of law" is the rule of courts, leading
Farber to come down, rather awkwardly-and quite misguidedly-on
the side of a constitutional duty on the part of Lincoln to have ad-
hered to and obeyed Dred Scott.)6 Likewise, Farber treats the Eman-
cipation Proclamation, not entirely unreasonably, as presenting an is-
sue of presidential military power to seize enemy property, within a
chapter focusing on Lincoln's questionable actions with respect to
"Individual Rights" (pp 152-57), not as an issue about Lincoln's con-
stitutional views of slavery.
6 See text accompanying notes 66-77.
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Slavery and Dred Scott should not be the tails of any dog. For
Lincoln, they were the beast itself. The Civil War was fought over the
question of the constitutional status of slavery and over the constitu-
tional power to decide that issue. Lincoln's election was a rejection of
Supreme Court supremacy with respect to constitutional meaning as
it concerned slavery; and secession was a rejection of the legitimacy
of a President who rejected the supremacy of the Supreme Court's in-
terpretations of the Constitution. To be sure, the dispute over slavery
and Dred Scott provided the triggers for disputes over sovereignty,
secession, and coercion-Farber's main themes-but those are
mighty important triggers, deserving of examination in their own
right.
Moreover, Lincoln's constitutional position on slavery was a fas-
cinating one. According to Lincoln, the Constitution affirmatively
protected the institution, as part of the bargain leading to its adop-
tion, and it was the duty of the North to honor the bargain struck by
the Fugitive Slave Clause. In his First Inaugural, he pledged to en-
force the Fugitive Slave Act. More than that, Lincoln publicly ac-
cepted as "implied constitutional law" the rather dubious proposition
that the federal government lacked any power to interfere with slav-
ery in the states choosing to have it.' Nonetheless, as President he
toyed with various compensated emancipation and colonization
schemes, pursuant to federal legislative power.9 And, of course, ulti-
mately, he issued the Emancipation Proclamation as an exercise of his
war power as Commander-in-Chief, and later ushered in the adoption
of the Thirteenth Amendment.
But before the war came, Lincoln was most closely associated
with the moderate anti-slavery position that the states could permit
or forbid slavery as they saw fit, but that Congress had plenary power
to exclude slavery in federal territories-the latter being the very po-
sition that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Dred
Scott. The Court's decision was wrong, horribly wrong, and seemingly
deliberately wrong. The Court's decision crushed Lincoln's faith in
the judiciary as an impartial instrument of constitutional interpreta-
tion, and led him by degrees ultimately to a very narrow, case-specific
conception of judicial authority, and to a very strongly "departmen-
talist" view of constitutional-interpretive power generally, under
which the notion of judicial supremacy over the political branches in
constitutional interpretation became tantamount, in Lincoln's eyes,
7 Lincoln, First InauguralAddress at 215-17 (cited in note 2).
8 Id at 222.
9 Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec 1, 1862), in Fehrenbacher, ed,
Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 393, 403-15 (cited in note 2). For an excellent narrative ac-
count, see David Herbert Donald, Lincoln 343-48,355,362-69 (Simon & Schuster 1995).
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to resignation of popular government and violation of the executive's
sworn duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States."' These are huge themes-with huge consequences for
the other issues Farber discusses (as I will develop below). But they
are, in the main, ignored in Lincoln's Constitution.
In addition to the slighting of slavery and Dred Scott (and the
specific substantive issues I address below), I have two other minor
quibbles with Farber's presentation. First, there are too many distract-
ing side excursions into modern Supreme Court cases that relate only
indirectly to Civil War-era themes. US. Term Limits, Inc v Thornton"
(pp 27-28, 30, 33, 38, 79-80), Alden v Maine'2 (p 28), New York v
United States'" (pp 95-96), and Printz v United States" (p 96) are in-
teresting recent cases, presenting important issues of federalism and
sovereignty-themes at the crux of the Civil War. But the issues pre-
sented by 1990s cases involving sovereign immunity from damages
suits and intergovernmental immunity are a far cry from secession
and civil war. Farber's subtle attempts to tar conservative Rehnquist
Court decisions with the brush of neo-Calhounism, while not utterly
implausible, are a bit strained. Mostly, though, they just feel out of
place-anachronistic-and detract from the narrative. Attempts to
extract specific lessons for today's marginal federalism controversies
from the great convulsions of interposition, nullification, secession,
and civil war have their limits. Some readers, perhaps, may cheer Far-
ber for making Civil War-era issues "come alive" for today's contro-
versies. Others will (like me) find Civil War issues lively enough on
their own, and will find Farber's modern-day morals-of-the-story dull,
and forced, by comparison."
Similarly, Farber's inclination to evaluate the constitutional pro-
priety of Lincoln's actions through the lens of Supreme Court deci-
sions rendered a hundred years later-as he does, for example, with
issues of separation of powers and executive power, invoking the
three-category paradigm of Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opin-
ion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer'6 (pp 120, 130-32, 156),
10 See Lincoln, First InauguralAddress at 220-21 (cited in note 2).
11 514 US 779 (1995).
12 527 US 706 (1999).
'3 505 US 144 (1992).
14 521 US 898 (1997).
Is Farber is explicit up front about his intention to use Lincoln-era controversies as a way of
evaluating modern controversies and, conversely, to use modern doctrine to evaluate Lincoln's
conduct (a point I take up presently): "in short, we can use Lincoln as a test of modern constitu-
tional doctrine, and use modern doctrine as a medium for assessing Lincoln's actions"
(p 2). Farber even says that "the book's references to modern constitutional doctrine" are "proba-
bly its most distinctive feature" (p 4).
16 343 US 579 (1952).
[71:691
The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation
and with respect to the First Amendment freedom of speech in time
of war, invoking Brandenburg v Ohio" (p 172)-feels very much like
modern, court-centric anachronism. Farber acknowledges the prob-
lem of anachronism, but nonetheless seems bound by modern judicial
paradigms and doctrinal tests."' For example, with respect to whether
punishing anti-war speech violated the First Amendment, Farber
finds this "a difficult question to answer because views of the First
Amendment have changed so much over the years" (p 171), "the Su-
preme Court did not seriously confront First Amendment issues until
about fifty years later, during World War I and its aftermath" (p 172),
and the Court's current doctrine differs markedly from those earlier
cases (p 172). Farber asks (pp 172-73):
Which of these standards should we use to assess the govern-
ment's actions in the Vallandigham case [involving the arrest and
military trial of an Ohio congressman for making a harsh anti-
war speech implicitly urging draft resistance] -the relaxed stan-
dard adopted sixty years later, the tighter one of seventy-five
years later, or the strict one of a century later? If the question is
whether Vallandigham's conviction should serve as a precedent
today, the answer seems clear. That kind of speech regulation
was decisively rejected by the Supreme Court over three dec-
ades ago, and was eroded badly several decades earlier. If the
question is whether Lincoln acted in knowing violation of con-
stitutional standards, it is hard to hold him responsible for failing
to anticipate the views that the Supreme Court itself would not
develop until many decades later.
If the question instead is whether Lincoln was "right" about the
First Amendment in some objective sense, it is hard to know
how to answer. What is the one true meaning of the First
Amendment?
Am I the only one who thinks this modern, court-centric, doctri-
nalist approach a bit strange? It is almost like Farber is asking
whether Lincoln could be held liable for damages (under current ju-
dicial doctrine of "qualified immunity") for having violated "clearly
established law [meaning, according to the judiciary, judicial deci-
sions] of which a reasonable official should have been aware,"" rather
than asking the question Farber seems so uncomfortable answering:
17 395 US 444 (1969).
18 With respect to executive power, see p 132 ("Although [Justice Jackson's Youngstown]
framework was articulated much later, it provides the most useful available method for analyzing
executive power, even for earlier executive actions. With this framework in mind, we are finally in
a position to assess the legality of Lincoln's actions.").
19 See, for example, Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635,640 (1987).
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did Lincoln's actions violate the Constitution, irrespective of whatever
the judges may once have said, may say today, or may say in the fu-
ture about the Constitution? Put somewhat differently, Farber's hand-
wringing feels a bit like saying that the question of whether Jupiter's
orbit around Earth was correctly calculated by a certain astronomer
at a given time depends on whether one uses a Ptolemaic or a Co-
pernican model of the solar system!
The correct answer, surely, is that the meaning of the First
Amendment, and thus the propriety of Lincoln's actions, must be
judged by a single standard of objective, non-time-bound, non-
judicial-doctrine-contingent constitutional meaning-the objective
meaning of the words and phrases of the text, taken in context, at the
time the document was adopted."' Such a standard obviously need
bear no relation to judicial doctrine at any particular time-past, pre-
sent, or future. One might excuse Lincoln for being mistaken, on the
grounds that he was a prisoner of the perceptions of his age and that
he did not have the benefit of controlling judicial precedents before
him or the great wisdom (?) of a century and a half of subsequent ju-
dicial precedents, but none of that answers the question whether his
actions were constitutionally proper or not.
Moreover, the available evidence is that Lincoln was rarely,
unless he wanted to be, a prisoner of the perceptions of his era; that
he would have regarded judicial decisions on point as instructive but
not necessarily controlling his conduct (the same Supreme Court be-
ing the body that had, of course, decided Dred Scott)2 ; and that he
understood quite well, without the benefit of the next fifteen decades
of judicial flailing about, the essential problem of whether, when, and
how far it is permissible to suppress or punish speech because of its
harmful tendencies. In fact, Lincoln appears to have grasped the di-
lemma extremely well. He did not need the Supreme Court's instruc-
tion, or anyone else's, to know the constitutional difficulty under the
First Amendment presented by the arrest and detention (or banish-
ment) of a "wily agitator"2 of a Congressman for making speeches
that tended, directly or indirectly, to impair military recruitment or
induce desertion."
20 For an extended defense of original-public-meaning textualism as the proper method of
constitutional interpretation, see Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive
Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 Georgetown L J 1113,1124-33 (2003).
21 See text accompanying notes 69-77 (discussing Lincoln's position with respect to the au-
thority of judicial interpretations of the Constitution).
22 Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in Fehrenbacher, ed.
Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 454,460 (cited in note 2).
23 Farber charts the Supreme Court's meandering First Amendment doctrine with respect
to the problem of "incitement" from the World War I-era cases to Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US
444 (1969), (pp 172-74). But Lincoln's two public letters on the issue, arising from Ex parte Vat-
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Farber's tendency to evaluate the constitutionality of Lincoln's
actions in terms of modern judicial doctrines weakens somewhat the
book's value as a corrective to modern constitutional law scholar-
ship's failure to appreciate the Civil War as a great event of constitu-
tional interpretation and reformation. That value is not lost entirely,
of course, but it is diminished by the fact that Farber, for all his bril-
liance, is a prisoner of the perceptions of his age. And that age-
landigham. 69 US 243 (1863), spotted all the issues and wrestled thoughtfully with their implica-
tions, decades and decades earlier. Lincoln notes, first, that the constitutional validity of govern-
ment action affecting expression might well depend on whether the action targets speech directly
or targets conduct, producing an incidental restriction of speech that is mixed together with such
conduct (105 years before United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367 (1968)). He concedes that if Val-
landigham's arrest was "for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism
of the course of the Administration, and in condemnation of the Military orders of the General,"
that "the arrest was wrong." Lincoln, To Corning at 459 (cited in note 22). "But the arrest, as I un-
derstand, was made for a very different reason," to wit, that Vallandigham "was laboring, with
some effect, to prevent the raising of troops" and
to encourage desertions from the army. .. . He was not arrested because he was damaging
the political prospects of the Administration, or the personal interests of the Commanding
General, but because he was damaging the Army .... He was warring upon the Military
.... If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest
was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory
evidence.
Id at 459-60.
Lincoln continues by defending the less-harsh consequence of the arrest, when compared
with alternative approaches and their attendant harms (over fifty years before Learned Hand's
Masses opinion employed a similar calculus, Masses Publishing Co v Patten, 244 F 535 (SD NY
1917), and before the various "clear and present danger" formulations and applications of the Su-
preme Court over the next five decades). Lincoln wrote: "Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier
boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? ... I
think that in such a case to silence the agitator, and save the boy is not only constitutional, but
withal a great mercy." Lincoln, To Corning at 460. Lincoln also seems to know that these argu-
ments are not entirely satisfying, and he concludes with an argument that his type of constitu-
tional error is better than the alternative type of error:
If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain
proceedings are constitutional when. in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety re-
quires them, which would not be constitutional when, in the absence of rebellion or invasion.,
the public safety does not require them: in other words, that the Constitution is not, in its ap-
plication, in all respects the same, in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety,
as it is in time of profound peace and public security.
Id. This resembles a "compelling state interest" justification for what otherwise would be a First
Amendment violation. One may well disagree with Lincoln's application of these principles in the
particular case of Vallandigham, or with his assessment of the degree to which necessity required
the actions taken. But he appears to have understood the nature of the constitutional problem-
and, indeed, formulated his justification in terms similar to those which later judicial doctrine
adopted (and the application of which by those courts is fully as debatable). Lincoln believed that
some constitutional actor must make the ultimate judgment of the degree of necessity, and that in
time of war, that ultimate judgment must rest with "the man whom, for the time, the people have,
under the constitution, made the commander-in-chief, of their Army and Navy .... Abraham Lin-
coln, Reply to the Ohio Democratic Convention (June 29,1863), in Fehrenbacher, ed, Speeches and
Writings, 1859-1865 465.467 (cited in note 2).
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ours-tends to view all questions of constitutionality through the
prism of judicial development of doctrine.
My second quarrel with Farber's overall presentation is that
there is simply not enough Lincoln in Lincoln's Constitution. For a
book entitled Lincoln's Constitution and featuring, on the dust jacket
cover, a huge, bracing close-up of Lincoln's face staring the reader
straight in the eye, Farber has set forth and discussed remarkably lit-
tle of Lincoln's actual constitutional analysis. Instead, Farber's narra-
tive with respect to the issues of Lincoln's day draws on Madison,
Hamilton, Calhoun, Marshall, and others. The book is rich in such his-
torical constitutional analysis, and the committed constitutional histo-
rian will find it fascinating. But it is striking how little of the analysis
is Lincoln's.
This is not because there is little such material. On the contrary,
Lincoln's speeches and writings contain perhaps the most serious, sys-
tematic, and lucid discussions of vital constitutional issues of any
President in our nation's history (with the possible exception of
Madison, though most of his great constitutional work was not during
his years as President).24 That is part of what makes Lincoln such a
compelling example of presidential constitutional interpretation. One
hates to make a this-is-not-the-book-I-would-have-written point, but
a great narrative about "Lincoln's Constitution" could have been
built entirely on Lincoln's writings." Not all readers will agree, but I
would like to have seen a bit more of Lincoln and a bit less of every-
body else.
Does this get reflected in how Farber treats the issues? Is his
treatment less Lincolnesque than it otherwise might be, were the fo-
cus more on Lincoln's actual analysis of each problem? I think so, at
least in emphasis and at times in conclusion. It is the burden of the
remainder of this Review to show how this may be so, with respect to
three great questions: the constitutionality of secession; the authorita-
tiveness and binding character of Supreme Court interpretations of
the Constitution; and the scope of presidential power to take action
to preserve, protect, and defend the nation in time of crisis.
24 Indeed, Farber acknowledges that Madison's views, as much as or more than Lincoln's,
are the focus of nearly half the book: "if the first half of the book has a hero, that hero is as much
James Madison as Abraham Lincoln. Among antebellum thinkers, it was Madison who provided
the most cogent constitutional vision of the Union" (p 4).
25 1 may be prejudiced in this regard by having recently read Edmund S. Morgan's out-
standing short biography of Benjamin Franklin. Morgan's preface candidly states that his biogra-
phy is "the result of reading everything on the disk [containing all of Franklin's writings] and in
the volumes but not much else . Edmund S. Morgan, Benjamin Franklin xi (Yale 2002).
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III. "[N]o STATE, UPON ITS OWN MERE MOTION..."
The Civil War resolved an intensely theoretical constitutional is-
sue-where does "sovereignty" reside under the Constitution, in the
national government or in the states?-in an intensely practical way:
by force of arms. But if one were to "read" that resolution as if it were
a judicial opinion, how would one describe the "holding" of the case?
The correct answer, probably, is that the Civil War holds that individ-
ual states are not sovereign in the sense that any of them, acting sin-
gly or together, has a constitutional right to secede from the Union
that the nation as a whole is constitutionally obliged to honor; nor are
the states, as states, acting singly or together, the final and exclusive
judges, for themselves, of the meaning of the Constitution. As Lincoln
put it in his First Inaugural:
[N]o State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the
Union,-that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally
void; and that acts of violence, within any State or States, against
the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolu-
tionary, according to circumstances."'
Lincoln won his case, finally, at the Appomattox Court House in
1865. But was Lincoln's view right as a matter of first principles of the
Constitution?
In a word, Yes. But it is important to attend to what Lincoln does
not say as well as to what he does. Lincoln argues only that individual
states are not sovereign in the sense of being able to do as they
please; and that they are not supreme over the national government
in the sense of each state, for itself, or a group of states acting to-
gether, being the ultimate judge of whether the national government
has committed a material breach of the Constitution." But nowhere
does Lincoln argue that states may not properly interpret the Consti-
tution at all-that the views of the national government automatically
resolve any point of constitutional controversy. Still less does Lincoln
argue-how could he, given his stance on Dred Scott? -that all power
of constitutional interpretation is vested in the judicial branch of the
federal government, thereby excluding any right of states to judge
whether the Constitution has been violated by the national govern-
ment. Indeed, he pointedly disavows such a position, late in the First
Inaugural.' Rather, Lincoln argues simply that the Constitution has
26 Lincoln, First InauguralAddress at 218 (cited in note 2).
27 The latter was John Calhoun's argument, subject to the qualification that an individual
state's interpretation could be overruled by a decision of three-fourths of the other states. More
on Calhoun presently (see text accompanying notes 45-49).
28 Lincoln, First Inaugural Address at 220-21 (cited in note 2) (asserting that "the people
will have ceased, to be their own rulers" if constitutional questions are "irrevocably fixed by deci-
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not been and will not be violated by his administration and his poli-
cies-that the South has no just constitutional cause to secede, on any
fair reading of the document. Lincoln appears to concede that if the
federal government had deprived the South "of any clearly written
constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolu-
tion-certainly would, if such right were a vital one."2"
This is not Professor Farber's position. Instead, the position that
Farber defends is the position of the elder statesman James Madison
in 1828-1832 (in quite serious tension with, if not outright contradic-
tion of, the position of the younger Madison of The Federalist (1787-
1788) and of the Virginia Resolutions (1799-1800)).'" It is also the po-
sition of Daniel Webster and Joseph Story from the same anti-
nullification era (other important sources for Farber's analysis)." It is
the position of the Northern states opposing the Virginia and Ken-
tucky Resolutions in 1799.2 And it is the position of the modern Su-
preme Court: federal judicial supremacy. But federal judicial suprem-
acy was not at all Lincoln's argument against the constitutional pro-
priety of secession.
Lincoln's argument against secession stands on its own terms. It
is set forth most fully in his First Inaugural Address of March 4, 1861
and in his Special Message to Congress of July 4, 1861. The First In-
augural is a carefully constructed legal argument; it almost reads like
a brief, written by a lawyer accustomed to making logical arguments
rather than by a politician accustomed to rhetorical flourishes. Lin-
coln starts by contesting any claim that the federal government has
violated or intends to violate the Constitution: "Apprehension seems
to exist among the people of the Southern States," Lincoln says, that
his election poses a threat to their "property" (an important choice of
words), their peace, and their personal security." "There has never
been any reasonable cause for such apprehension," he contends, and
proceeds to develop what feels like "Point I" of the brief: as Presi-
dent, he will-he must, because of his oath-enforce all provisions of
the Constitution. He will not interfere with slavery in any state.) (A
sions of the Supreme Court"). I discuss at greater length below Lincoln's rejection of the idea of
judicial supremacy. See text accompanying notes 69-77.
29 Lincoln, First InauguralAddress at 219 (cited in note 2).
- For Madison's (inconsistent) views, see note 49.
31 On Webster, see pp 57-59. On Story, see pp 52-53. See also Joseph Story. I Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States §§ 306-96 at 279-381 (Da Capo reprint 1970) (originally
published in 1833).
32 See Jonathan Elliot. ed. 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 532-39 (Lippincott 2d ed 1863) (listing the answers of Delaware, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire. and Vermont to the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799).
33 Lincoln. First InauguralAddress at 215 (cited in note 2).
Id (disclaiming any "purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of
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bit later Lincoln says that he understands the right of a state to its
own "domestic institutions" to "now be implied constitutional law,"
which he would not object to "being made express, and irrevocable"
by way of formal constitutional amendment.)" He will enforce the
obligations of the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution, because
it is part of the Constitution he has sworn to uphold, and the Fugitive
Slave Act of Congress implementing it." While there are small points
of disagreement as to the precise meaning of the Fugitive Slave
Clause, Lincoln declares that he takes "the official oath to-day, with
no mental reservations, and with no purpose to construe the Consti-
tution or laws, by any hypercritical rules."" The South has no cause
for alarm, and no reason to assume that he will deprive any state of
its claimed rights under the Constitution, including protection of the
institution of slavery in the states that choose it.
The next section of the Inaugural develops "Point II" of Lin-
coln's brief: no state has a unilateral constitutional right to secede, at
its sole option, that the Union as a whole is constitutionally obliged
to recognize and grant. Lincoln argues that "in contemplation of uni-
versal law, and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpet-
ual.""' Perpetuity is "implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law
of all national governments"; the Constitution does not provide a
right of withdrawal in terms; such a right is in the nature of things
contrary to the creation of a government whose perpetuity is implied;
it is contrary to the nature of the specific government created by the
Constitution, which is a government proper and not a mere league; a
unilateral right of secession is not supported even on the theory that
the United States is a mere association of states in the nature of a
compact; and secession is at odds with the language of the Constitu-
tion itself, which announces at the outset the goal of providing "a
more perfect union" even than the "perpetual" one contemplated by
the Articles of Confederation." The argument-a combination of pos-
tulates about the nature of governments, specific references to the
Constitution's text, and arguments from constitutional structure-
takes Lincoln all of four paragraphs. From all this, Lincoln draws the
conclusion that no state may lawfully secede "upon its own mere mo-
tion."4 '
slavery in the States where it exists").
35 Id at 222.
36 Id at 216-17.
37 Id at 217.
38 Id (emphasis added).
39 ld at 217-18.
40 Id at 218.
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The next section of the Inaugural ("Point III") sets forth the le-
gal consequences of this conclusion for presidential action, in what
becomes the legal theory under which Lincoln fights the Civil War:"
I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the
laws, the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent of my ability, I
shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon
me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the
States. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part;
and I shall perform it, so far as practicable, unless my rightful
masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite
means, or, in some authoritative manner, direct the contrary."
It is worth pausing at this point to consider this passage and its
implications for Professor Farber's chapter on "The Legitimacy of
Coercion" (pp 92-114). Farber insists that we "take seriously the
claim that even if secession was unconstitutional, the North should
have acquiesced" (p 93). Farber is right; the question is serious: was
preserving the Union, through force, really worth the lives of six hun-
dred thousand men (if one had known the cost in advance)? Farber's
discussion is fascinating, especially concerning the Buchanan admini-
stration's legal opinion that, while secession was unconstitutional, the
federal government could not "make war" against a state and thus
was powerless to prevent secession. Lincoln's rebuttal, in this section
of the Inaugural, consistent with his legal theory of the Civil War
generally, was that this was not "making war" against another sover-
eign, for secession was not legally possible and the Confederacy did
not exist as a legal entity. Rather, this was suppressing an unlawful
rebellion and executing the laws of the United States in all of the
states to the full extent possible.
But Farber misses an essential point here (to which I return be-
low): Lincoln fought the Civil War out of a sense of constitutional
duty, flowing from his oath of office to "preserve, protect and defend"
the Constitution and his sworn duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. Given his conclusion that secession was constitu-
tionally invalid, Lincoln felt he had no other choice. On this point,
Lincoln was what we today would call a constitutional "formalist." He
believed it not open to him to acquiesce to secession. He was bound
by his oath to enforce the laws, in accordance with his understanding
of the Constitution's design for a perpetual Union: "You have no
41 For development of this point about Lincoln's constitutional theory of the Civil War, see
Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 Cal L Rev 291,
302-13 (2002).
42 Lincoln, First InauguralAddress at 218 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added).
43 Id at 218-19.
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oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government," he said to the
South in the penultimate paragraph of the Inaugural, "while I shall
have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect and defend' it."4 Ab-
sent such a sworn duty, it is hard to justify the North's fighting so ter-
rible a war simply to keep in those who wanted out. Fighting for a
constitutional theory of Union-the North did not fight, at least not
initially, a war against slavery-is hard to defend on purely pragmatic
policy grounds, unless one has a sense of constitutional and moral
duty backing it.
To return to Lincoln's argument for the indissolubility of the Un-
ion: the First Inaugural does not directly engage the elaborate theo-
retical constructs of John Calhoun and others concerning state sover-
eignty. Perhaps Lincoln refrained from challenging "state sover-
eignty" in order not to offend the states of the Upper South that had
not seceded, where the notion had some currency. But in his July 4,
1861 Special Message to Congress-after the Upper South had de-
fected-Lincoln let loose, attacking at length the "sophism" that
"there is some omnipotent, and sacred supremacy, pertaining to a
State-to each State of our Federal Union." Lincoln effectively de-
molishes Calhoun's intricate, difficult, contrived theories with a few
quick blows: the term "sovereignty" is not even in the Constitution;
none of the states (except Texas) was ever sovereign outside the Un-
ion; and, indeed, "the Union gave each of them, whatever of inde-
pendence, and liberty, it has., 41 Moreover, Lincoln adds, by the same
logic according to which one or a few states could secede from the
others, all the other states could drive a single state out of the Union,
by collectively "seceding" from it-a position surely anathema to
"state's rights" politicians.4'
Farber's book is at its best in disentangling the convoluted
strands of Calhounian and neo-Calhounian Southern theories of
state sovereignty and secession (pp 57-91).' Farber's analysis (quite
unlike Calhoun's) is lucid and enlightening. Calhoun's specific the-
44 Idat224.
45 Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session at 255 (cited in note 5).
46 Id at 255-56.
47 Id at 258 ("IThe whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power, and
denounce the act as the greatest outrage upon State rights.").
48 Again, however, Farber does this work without much help from Lincoln. The arguments
he makes come from Alexander Hamilton (pp 63,96-98). John Marshall (pp 50-57). Daniel Web-
ster (pp 57-58). Andrew Jackson (pp 61-62), Joseph Story (pp 52-53), and especially the elder
statesman James Madison (pp 62-69, 83, 85-91). Even Lincoln's hapless predecessor. James Bu-
chanan, gets some attention (pp 75-76, 83). The arguments made in Lincoln's Inaugural take up,
curiously, less than a page of Farber's analysis on this point (pp 78-79), yet they are wonderfully
clear and succinct. Farber appears to regard Lincoln's views as essentially a rehash of these ear-
lier ones. but as I will discuss presently. there is at least one important difference. See text accom-
panying note 63.
2004]
The University of Chicago Law Review [71:691
ory-that a decision of a state denying the existence of a national
governmental power should have the effect of nullifying the act of
national power unless the state's decision is reversed by three-fourths
of the states (the number of states needed to ratify a constitutional
amendment) is, as Farber (building on Madison) makes clear, quite il-
logical, almost contrived. The theory would in effect permit a single
state to amend the Constitution or dictate an idiosyncratic controlling
interpretation of its provisions, unless three-fourths of the states re-
jected such a view (p 68). This theory turns the three-fourths-of-the-
states ratification requirement of Article V on its head. One is left
with the same feeling Madison expressed in 1830-that it would be
hard to take such a theory of state sovereignty seriously were it not
associated with such "distinguished names and high authorities."'
But refuting a bad theory does not prove its opposite. To be sure,
the Southern arguments for interposition, nullification, and secession,
from the 1790s to the 1860s, frequently relied on theories of state sov-
ereignty or interpretive supremacy."' But it is not clear why such a
49 James Madison, To Edward Everett (Aug 1830), in 4 Letters and Other Writings of James
Madison 95, 102 (Lippincott 1865). But alas, the "distinguished names and high authorities" that
could plausibly and responsibly be invoked in behalf of a state power of "nullification" include
James Madison himself, and even more so Thomas Jefferson, in their primary authorship of the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and in Madison's defense of the Virginia
Resolutions in the Report of 1800. Madison's 1830 letter to Everett, on which Farber relies heav-
ily, is simply irreconcilable with the Report of 1800 in vital respects. The Report of 1800 emphati-
cally denied federal judicial supremacy over the States: the Everett letter of 1830 embraced judi-
cial supremacy as the sufficient answer to nullification advocates. See James Madison, Madison's
Report on the Virginia Resohtions (Report of 1800), in Elliot, ed, 4 Debates 546,549 (cited in note
32):
However true, therefore, it may be, that the judicial department is, in all questions submitted
to it by the forms of the Constitution, to decide in the last resort, this resort must necessarily
be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the other departments of the government
not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judi-
cial, as well as the other departments, hold their delegated trusts.
Contrast Madison, To Everett at 100-01 (warning opponents of federal judicial supremacy that "a
supremacy of law in the land" requires "a supremacy in the exposition and execution of the law").
The Virginia Resolutions and the Report of 1800 maintain that the interposition of the states in
resistance to allegedly unconstitutional acts of the national government is a matter of constitu-
tional duty. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, in Elliot. ed, 4 Debates 528. 528 (assert-
ing of the General Assembly of Virginia that "it is their duty to watch over and oppose every in-
fraction of those principles which constitute the only basis of that union"). See also id at 529 ("[lit
would mark a reproachful inconsistency and criminal degeneracy, if an indifference were now
shown to the most palpable violation of one of the rights thus declared and secured."); Madison,
Report of 1800 at 546 (reaffirming and defending the states' duty to oppose and resist infractions
of the U.S. Constitution). The Everett letter of 1830 regarded such interpositions as entailing the
"destruction of all equipoise between the Federal Government and the State governments" and
being "fatal to the constituted relation between the two Governments." Madison, To Everett at
101.
50 This was the form in which the argument was made, not only by Calhoun, but also (ar-
guably) by Madison and (certainly) by Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. re-
spectively. See Madison, Virginia Resohtions at 528-29 (cited in note 49);Thomas Jefferson, Ken-
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sweeping theory would have been thought necessary to the claimed
right of a state to resist alleged unconstitutional action by the na-
tional government. Why would it not be sufficient justification for
state resistance (in theory at least, and leaving open the question of
what form such resistance properly could take) that the federal gov-
ernment had committed a very serious breach of the Constitution, at
the expense of the states or the rights of the people generally, with no
reasonable prospect for remedy at the federal level in the ordinary
course of business? Shorn of some of Jefferson's more reckless views,
and Madison's uncharacteristically careless language, this was, after
all, the theory of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions challenging,
and proposing concerted resistance to, the Alien and Sedition Acts.
So modified, what, exactly, is wrong with the theory?
Consider some hypothetical examples. Imagine, for instance, that
the national government deprived a state of all representation in
Congress, in plain violation of the Constitution. Might not the af-
fected state be justified, at least in theory, in declaring that a material
breach of the Constitution had occurred? And if no other remedy
were available, over a long train of years, might not such a breach jus-
tify the extreme remedy of secession? Or imagine that the national
government, sustained by the federal courts, had made it a crime to
speak or publish harsh denunciations of the federal government-the
true-life situation that provoked the Virginia and Kentucky Resolu-
tions. Might not the states, as Madison and Jefferson urged, properly
interpose state power to frustrate, and if possible reverse, the national
government's violation of the Constitution, through every available
means? Or imagine a "Second Dred Scott" decision-a specter raised
by U.S. Senate candidate Lincoln in 1858"- requiring free states to
recognize and permit slavery within their borders, as a matter of fed-
eral constitutional law. Might not a state justifiably refuse to accede
to such an outrage on its right to exclude slavery, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's (lawless) decision to the contrary? 2 Might not the
form of such resistance include de facto "nullification" of the decision
through the interposition of state power against it? In the absence of
all other remedies, might not a state be justified-even constitution-
ally justified-in seceding, over a matter of vital constitutional (and
moral) principle, rather than acquiescing in a violation of the Consti-
tucky Resoltions of 1798 and 1799. in Elliot, ed, 4 Debates 540,540-45 (cited in note 32).
51 Abraham Lincoln. First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Mr. Lincoln's Reply (Aug 21. 1858). in
Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed, Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, 1832-1858 508. 524. 527 (Li-
brary of America 1989) (concluding that all that "is necessary for the nationalization of slavery" is
"the next Dred Scott decision").
52 I have suggested this possibility, in response to a similar hypothetical, elsewhere. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some
Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 Albany L Rev 671.684-85 (1995).
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tution, affecting the rights of the people of the state, and making the
state complicit in the violation and the resulting human oppression?
Answering some or all of these questions in the affirmative does
not require a theory of state interpretive supremacy. It merely re-
quires a theory of state interpretive legitimacy, and denial of any
premise of federal interpretive supremacy.
The affirmative case for a legitimate constitutional power of
state governments independently to interpret the U.S. Constitution,
and to resist perceived federal government violations of it, is not un-
problematic, as Farber ably demonstrates (pp 66-69). Such a practice
might well generate more disuniformity in constitutional interpreta-
tion; sometimes, but not always, such disuniformity itself would vio-
late the Constitution (like South Carolina's attempted nullification of
the tariff); and some such interpretations would simply be wrong,
and a part ought not be permitted to impair the Constitution of the
whole. There are good, if imperfect, answers to these objections: non-
uniform interpretation exists elsewhere in our constitutional order,
and a certain amount of it is tolerable. Indeed, disuniformity may be
preferable to a uniformly wrong interpretation, with no chance of re-
versal, and there is evidence that the framers contemplated state gov-
ernments operating as checks on the national government in this re-
gard.4 Moreover, the possibility of erroneous constitutional interpre-
tations is not a problem unique to state interpretation. It exists wher-
ever interpretive power exists, and exists without the possibility of a
check or corrective if interpretive supremacy is vested in a particular
body.
53 For a tariff to operate in some states but not others would appear to violate the constitu-
tional requirement that "all Duties. Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." US Const Art 1, § 8, cl 1.
-u See, for example, Federalist 28 (Hamilton). in The Federalist 176,179-80 (Wesleyan 1961)
(Jacob E. Cooke, ed):
Power being almost always the rival of power; the General Government will at all times
stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments; and these will have the same
disposition towards the General Government. The people, by throwing themselves into ei-
ther scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can
make use of the other, as the instrument of redress.
See also Federalist 33 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 203,207:
But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant
to its constitutional powers but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the
smaller societies will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usur-
pation, and will deserve to be treated as such.
See also Federalist 44 (Madison), in The Federalist 299,305 (allowing that "in the last resort" the
people of the states may, by "election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurp-
ers"); Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347. 351 ("Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will controul each other: at the same time that
each will be controuled by itself.").
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The affirmative case for state government interpretive compe-
tence (but not supremacy) is surprisingly straightforward, finding
support in the text, structure, history, and early interpretations of the
Constitution. The text designates "this Constitution"-the document
itself-as the supreme law of the land, and not the interpretations of
any specific actor or body? The oath to abide by the Constitution, re-
lied on in Marbury v Madison" to support the argument for an inde-
pendent judicial power of constitutional interpretation, applies to
state and federal officials alike. The structure of the Constitution,
while not making states supreme over the national government, does
leave them structurally independent of the organs of national gov-
ernment; they are not subordinate agencies or administrative districts
of the national government. And, as noted, prominent framers seem
to have regarded state governments as important checks on unconsti-
tutional usurpations of power by the national government."7 The ar-
gument for independent state interpretive power is supported by
numerous passages in The Federalist; by the well-reasoned arguments
set forth by Madison and Jefferson, respectively, in the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 against the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts; and by Madison's Report of 1800 defending those Resolu-
tions. It is even supported, indirectly, by the reasoning and logic of
Marbury v Madison." Indeed, the Civil War's "holding" against the
South can, in a sense, be seen as a case-specific resolution of the con-
stitutional question of whether a state may secede by the precise
mode of resolution the framers anticipated: by the relative weight of
arms and sentiment of the people. "
Lincoln did not definitively address the question of the existence
or proper scope of a state's power to interpret the Constitution, other
than to deny that individual states are sovereign. Their views do not
control the actions of the national government; the part may not dic-
55 The argument that the Constitution designates the Supreme Court, by implication, as the
single authoritative interpreter of the Constitution is hard to square with the most natural reading
of the Constitution's text, structure, and history. For an extended argument in this regard, see Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen. The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83
Georgetown L J 217 (1994) (arguing for executive branch interpretive authority). See also Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen. The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 Mich L Rev 2706 (2003); Michael
Stokes Paulsen. Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency after Twenty-Five Years. 83 Minn L
Rev 1337, 1349-59 (1999) (arguing, and collecting evidence in support of the proposition, that
"[jiudicial supremacy is simply not an originalist position" and "is consistent with none of the evi-
dence we have of the original meaning of the Constitution").
56 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57 See note 54.
58 1 have sketched the overall argument. and gathered the surprisingly supportive passages
from The Federalist in Paulsen, 101 Mich L Rev 2706 (cited in note 55).
59 Federalist 28 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 176, 176-78 (cited in note 54) (appearing to
suggest that the people may make use of the state to organize armed forces to resist usurpations
of the national government).
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tate to the whole. Lincoln preferred to argue that, on any fair reading
of the Constitution, there had been no material breach justifying the
extreme measure of secession. But he appeared prepared to concede,
at least for the sake of argument, the existence of a potential remedy
of secession for a very serious breach of the Constitution by the or-
gans of the national government (though it is unclear whether Lin-
coln would have regarded it as a constitutional or extra-constitutional
remedy):
All profess to be content in the Union, if all constitutional rights
can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written
in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not .... Think, if
you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written provision
of the Constitution has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of
numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly
written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view,
justify revolution-certainly would, if such right were a vital one.
But such is not our case.
But such is not our case. Recall that "Point I" of the Inaugural
had been devoted to reassuring the South of Lincoln's commitment
to non-interference with slavery in the states and full enforcement of
the Fugitive Slave Clause. Lincoln would not, he emphasized, act in
any way contrary to the Constitution, whatever his personal views
concerning slavery.
Significantly, however, Lincoln did not pledge to act in accor-
dance with the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution-
like Dred Scott's denial to the federal government of the power to
prohibit slavery in the territories. Indeed, it is at this point in the In-
augural that Lincoln addresses the proposition that it is the Supreme
Court, exclusively and finally, that decides matters of constitutional
interpretation:
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I
deny that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the
parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also
entitled to very high respect and consideration in all paral[l]el
cases by all other departments of the government. And while it
is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any
given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that
particular case, with the chance that it may be over-ruled, and
never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne
than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time, the
60 Lincoln. First InauguralAddress at 219 (cited in note 2).
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candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government,
upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevo-
cably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they
are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal ac-
tions, the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having,
to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the
hands of that eminent tribunal."
Lincoln's stance is carefully hedged with ambiguity. The Court's
decisions do bind parties (but what if the government were a party?).
It is better, as a rule (but not always?), to abide by an erroneous out-
come in the particular case but seek to have it overruled. But the bot-
tom line is clear: the Supreme Court's decisions cannot be regarded
as final and binding on the political choices and life of the nation
without the people resigning their government into the hands of "that
eminent tribunal" that decided Dred Scott.2
There are two points here. First, Lincoln's argument against the
constitutional validity of secession does not-cannot-depend, as the
arguments of the authorities collected and embraced by Farber do, on
the proposition of federal judicial exclusivity and supremacy in con-
stitutional interpretation. Quite the contrary, as noted, Lincoln's ar-
gument assumes the position that a very serious breach of the
Constitution by the national government would provide just cause
for state resistance.
Second, at the same time that Lincoln appears to concede the
theoretical legitimacy of secession for grave constitutional breaches,
he consistently maintains the position that his own and his party's
pledged resistance to the Court's decision in Dred Scott as a rule gov-
erning his administration's actions is not such a breach. He does not
retreat one inch from his stance, most fully developed in his debates
with Stephen Douglas in the Senate campaign of 1858, that Dred
Scott is wrong and cannot be regarded as binding the actions of po-
61 ld at 220-21.
62 Some have found Lincoln's remarks a softening, or retreat, from views he had expressed
more stridently as a Senate candidate. Harry V. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom: A braham Lincoln
and the Coming of the Civil War 341-43 (Rowman and Littlefield 2000) ("The paragraph in the
inaugural on Dred Scott ... is as little contentious as Lincoln can make it."). Indeed. what Lincoln
had portrayed, in his Senate campaign debates with Douglas, as a conspiracy involving Chief Jus-
tice Taney, the Supreme Court, and Democratic politicians, became in the Inaugural the decisions
of an "eminent tribunal" in performance of a duty "from which they may not shrink": and it is not
their fault "if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes." Lincoln. First Inaugural
Address at 221 (cited in note 2).
63 Lincoln does not specify whether such resistance is constitutionally justified or simply
morally justified but of a revolutionary nature: and he urges restraint in such resistance, while
there is any hope of a remedy within the existing constitutional framework. Lincoln, First lnaugu-
ralAddress at 219 (cited in note 2) ("Will you hazard so desperate a step, while there is any possi-
bility that any portion of the ills you fly from, have no real existence?").
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litical officials. Lincoln's argument against the constitutional validity
of secession thus depends as well on the constitutional propriety of
his view that the Supreme Court's decisions are not final and binding
as a rule governing official conduct (including his own), outside of
the specific case where rendered.
Lincoln's position bothered more than a few folks in the South,
who saw in it confirmation of their worst fears: the Lincoln admini-
stration stood for deliberate violation of what the Southern states re-
garded as their constitutional rights. Such a view of Lincoln was, in-
deed, reasonable-if the South was entitled to assume that the Su-
preme Court's interpretations of the Constitution were controlling
law, binding elected officials. If a President's refusal to be bound, pro-
spectively, by the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution
is itself a serious breach of the Constitution, the South would, by Lin-
coln's own logic, have just cause to complain. The position is best ex-
pressed in a congressional speech by Senator Nicholson of Tennessee,
between Lincoln's election and his inauguration, which is fairly rep-
resentative of the views of other Southern politicians at the time as
well."
This party [the Republican party] promises us, as the induce-
ment to our repose, that our rights of property in slaves shall not
be interfered with in the States, because the Constitution recog-
nizes those rights. But they refuse to extend that promise to our
rights of property in slaves outside of the States, although, upon
the authority of the high judicial tribunal of the country for de-
ciding constitutional questions, we have exactly the same rights
outside of the States, within the jurisdiction of the Federal Gov-
ernment, as the owners of any other species of property have.
They concede our rights in the one case, because they are ex-
pressly recognized by the Constitution; they deny them in the
other, and in so doing, repudiate the authoritative adjudication of
the Supreme Court.
It was to secure repose that the South sought for years, and with
earnestness, to secure the recognition of congressional non-
intervention as the established policy of the country. Although
this principle has been declared by the Supreme Court to be the
true intent and meaning of the Constitution, we have failed to se-
64 For an account of Southern newspaper reactions, see Donald, Lincoln at 284 (cited in
note 9).
65 For an excellent sampling, see Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom at 203-36 (cited in note 62)
(discussing speeches and writings of Jefferson Davis and Alexander Stephens).
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cure repose, because the Republican party repudiated that sol-
emn adjudication, and resolved to continue the agitation of the
question until its reversal could be secured.
Professor Farber's position is the same as Senator Nicholson's:
elected officials must regard the Supreme Court's interpretations of
the Constitution as binding, even if they regard those decisions as
wrong. As discussed in the next Part of this Review, this places Farber
decidedly at odds with Lincoln's position on judicial authority. Just as
fundamentally, however, it also puts Farber at odds with Lincoln's ar-
gument against the validity of secession. For if Farber is right about
federal judicial supremacy, Lincoln's stance against Dred Scott was
wrong, and the South was legitimately within its rights to secede in
response to Lincoln's pledged gross violation of fundamental consti-
tutional principles. Indeed, Farber says almost exactly that: "If Lin-
coln meant to ignore all judicial interpretations in carrying out his
law enforcement duties as president, the South would have had a
valid complaint, because Lincoln would be systematically violating
the legal rights of individual Southerners" (p 187). Thus, Farber's ju-
dicial supremacist view ironically undermines his argument against
secession: states may not secede, because the Supreme Court, not
state governments, gets the last word on constitutional interpretation.
But if the Supreme Court gets the last word, the South was right to
regard Lincoln's election as an assault on the South's constitutional
rights.
So who is right about judicial supremacy: Professor Farber or
President Lincoln?
IV. "IT]HAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL"
It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Civil War repudi-
ated the notion that the Supreme Court's constitutional pronounce-
ments are binding on all other actors in our constitutional system, but
not by very much. Lincoln campaigned against the binding nature of
Dred Scott, other than as a rule of decision for the parties in that par-
ticular case. He campaigned against popular acquiescence in a poten-
tial "Second Dred Scott" opinion that might confirm and extend the
66 Cong Globe, 36th Cong, 2d Sess 187 (Dec 24, 1860) (remarks of Senator Nicholson) (em-
phasis added). A week later, Senator Judah Benjamin made a similar argument for the constitu-
tional propriety of secession based on the North's asserted violations of the Constitution. Cong
Globe.36th Cong,2d Sess 212-17 (Dec 31,1860) (asking "who is to judge" when the "compact has
been broken," noting that the Constitution "has provided for a supreme judiciary to determine
cases arising in law or equity which may involve the construction of the Constitution." and arguing
that in cases "not susceptible of judicial decision" impairing political rights of the states, the states
must be permitted to exercise a constitutional right of "self-defense" against unconstitutional ac-
tions of the national government).
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original, and introduce a requirement that Northern states tolerate
slavery within their borders. In a very real sense, Lincoln's election
constituted an electoral rejection of the Supreme Court's supremacy
in matters of constitutional law. The South's attempted secession was
a rejection of the validity of that electoral rejection and of the consti-
tutional views of the North more generally. Lincoln's rejection of se-
cession, in turn, rejected the legitimacy of the South's constitutional
objections. And so the issue was joined, and would be determined on
the battlefield.
Putting the guns to one side, whose view was right? The Civil
War's resolution of this question has not had the staying power of its
holding against secession. Appomattox settled for all time the ques-
tion of the constitutional validity of secession, against the position of
the South. But Appomattox's implicit holding for Lincoln's position
on the supremacy of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Con-
stitution has been overturned by subsequent history. The conven-
tional view today, the dominant view in legal academia (and of course
the view held by the courts themselves), is that of Senator Nicholson
and Professor Farber.
Farber offers three arguments for judicial supremacy, all of which
end up endorsing Dred Scott as controlling law, binding on the execu-
tive (though Farber is obviously quite uncomfortable with this spe-
cific result). First, Farber defends judicial supremacy on the ground
that "[s]ome authoritative method is needed to resolve disputes
about the meaning of the Constitution" (p 183). At first blush, this
sounds eminently sensible. Who could question the need to resolve
disputes, and the logic of giving courts this role? But on inspection,
the argument proves to be deeply superficial-surely one of the great
unexamined legal premises of our time. Of course, "one of the key
functions of courts is to provide a peaceful, orderly method of resolv-
ing disputes" (p 183), but what if the courts' resolution is dead
wrong-indeed, so wrong and disruptive that it is destructive of the
peaceful dispute-resolution function asserted to justify judicial final-
ity in the first place? And what about checks and balances? Does not
our Constitution deliberately prefer division, tension, uncertainty,
and dynamic equilibrium over "authoritative" resolution? Is not fear
of wrong or harmful authoritative political acts precisely what the
Constitution's separation of powers is all about? Is not Dred Scott
Exhibit A in the case against judicial supremacy?
Farber's second argument is even weaker: judicial supremacy isjustified by "the unique strength of courts as interpreters of the Con-
stitution" (p 183). This is because "the judicial process is uniquely de-
signed as a forum of principle rather than politics, with its presenta-
tion of opposing arguments, its deliberative qualities, and its mandate
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for reasoned explanation of decisions" (p 183). Well, now. Sometimes
yes, sometimes emphatically no, but certainly not invariably is this the
case. Again, what of Dred Scott? Is this not the definitive example of
judicial willfulness run amok? Of judicial politics rather than princi-
ple? Of "reasoned explanation" that cannot be taken seriously as
competent, faithful interpretation of the Constitution? If the response
is that Dred Scott was an aberration, the point is made: the political
branches should not be bound to carry out an aberrant, wrong, unjus-
tifiable constitutional decision of the courts contrary to the Constitu-
tion and to the national interest. Where the courts fail miserably in
exercising their supposed "unique strength" as constitutional inter-
preters, the competence argument for judicial supremacy collapses.
Are the courts, over time and over a range of issues, more likely to be
superior constitutional interpreters? Perhaps. But this scarcely sup-
ports a principle of unconstrained judicial supremacy. It supports at
most a principle of deference, over time and over a range of issues, to
the considered, well-reasoned judgments of the judiciary. But it also
allows for the propriety of the political branches serving to check
errant decisions of the Court that seriously depart from the
Constitution.
In the end, Farber blinks. He cannot bear the implications of his
own defense of judicial supremacy, and so ends up waffling incoher-
ently as to whether or not Lincoln had a duty to follow Dred Scott.
He offers this escape hatch from judicial supremacy in the instance of
Dred Scott: "Given the degree of division within the Court, the con-
fusing multiple opinions, and the analytical weakness of Taney's opin-
ion, Dred Scott arguably was not a definitive judicial resolution of the
issue, as Lincoln himself argued in his Springfield speech about the
case" (p 185). But if Farber means these factors seriously, his hy-
pothesized exception swallows the judicial supremacy rule: division
within the Court might mean any seriously contested decision that
produced a dissent; confusing multiple opinions might mean any case
with concurring rationales differing from the majority's; and analyti-
cal weakness might well embrace any poorly reasoned (or simply
wrong) judicial interpretation. If any of these factors (or best two out
of three) obviates judicial supremacy, then Farber has stated that any
and all analytically weak, confusing judicial decisions generating seri-
ous division on the Court need not be regarded as binding on the po-
litical branches. If that's his proposition, I'll take it.6'
But plainly that is not what Farber has in mind. A sentence or
two later he runs back home to judicial supremacy, stating that if a
judicial rule "had been well settled, so that individuals had clearly de-
67 See generally Paulsen. 83 Georgetown L J 217 (cited in note 55).
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fined legal rights, then Lincoln would have been bound to respect
those rights" (p 185)-a formulation that many in the South would
have thought (and the Supreme Court at the time would have
thought) described Dred Scott. Two pages later yet, Farber claims that
if Lincoln was really claiming a right to disregard judicial interpreta-
tions of the Constitution in carrying out his law enforcement duties as
President, he would be "violating the legal rights of individual South-
erners" and the South "would have had a valid complaint"
(p 187). Then Farber zags again: Lincoln could sign legislation ban-
ning slavery in the territories, notwithstanding Dred Scott: "The im-
portance of the slavery issue far outweighed the value of settling con-
stitutional disputes efficiently, and the decision itself was so deeply
flawed as to be entitled to little respect in its own right" (p 187). But
Lincoln could only do this because signing a bill "would violate no
one's legal rights" and "the legal process would offer protection
against any actual violation of legal rights" (p 187)-presumably by
striking down the unconstitutional statute. Yet Farber had said, just a
few paragraphs before, that if a President knows "how a court will ul-
timately resolve a specific dispute within its competence," he must not
"evade the legally inevitable outcome" (p 186). To "drag his heels in
this situation" would be "lawless" (p 186). Is that clear?
The essential problem with Farber's position, in common with all
defenses of judicial supremacy, is that it ultimately collapses either
into a requirement of obedience to judicial decisions no matter what
or into a coordinate power to refuse obedience to them whenever the
relevant political actor is persuaded that the decision is wrong.w Far-
ber defends the former position, does not like where it leads with re-
spect to Dred Scott, but cannot bear the opposite view, and thus ends
up teetering all over the place, before finally falling down in the judi-
cial supremacy camp.
Lincoln experienced something of the same journey, but he
ended up going in the opposite direction, and finally standing his
ground relatively firmly against judicial supremacy. Earlier in his ca-
reer, Lincoln had expressed great faith in "the law" and, at least by
implication, in judicial authority." Dred Scott upended that faith. Still,
he clung to a view of the importance of adhering to judicial decisions,
as a matter of precedent, and argued against having Dred Scott reaf-
68 I have developed this dilemma elsewhere. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman
Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 Cardozo L Rev 81
(1993).
69 Donald, Lincoln at 80-81 (cited in note 9) (reporting that, in an 1838 speech to the Young
Men's Lyceum, Lincoln called for "reverence for the laws" to be "the political religion of the na-
tion").
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firmed, confirmed, or extended."' That theme became increasingly
strident in the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858, laden with sugges-
tions that the Dred Scott decision was the product of a sinister con-
spiracy and suggesting the importance of being prepared to stand
against adherence to any subsequent decision extending it." By the
time of his Inaugural, Lincoln's position was that judicial decisions
are only law for the particular case, and the parties to that case, and are
entitled to appropriate respect and consideration by the other de-
partments of the national government-that is, that the other
branches should take them for what they are worth. Within a few
months, Lincoln erased even that line, refusing to abide by Chief Jus-
tice Taney's order in Ex parte Merryman" invalidating Lincoln's sus-
pension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declining to
enforce Taney's granting of the writ and contempt order against one
of Lincoln's generals.13 Lincoln believed, and continued to believe,
70 Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois (June 26,
1857), in Fehrenbacher. ed, Speeches and Writings, 1832-1858 390,392-95 (cited in note 51) ("We
know the court that made it, has often over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to
have it to over-rule this.").
71 See, for example, Lincoln. First Debate, Lincoln's Reply at 524-27 (cited in note 51);
Abraham Lincoln, Fifth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Mr. Lincoln's Reply (Oct 7, 1858), in Fehren-
bacher, ed, Speeches and Writings, 1832-1858 701, 713-17 (cited in note 51): Abraham Lincoln,
"House Divided" Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 16. 1858), in Fehrenbacher, ed, Speeches and
Writings, 1832-1858 426,431-32.
72 17 F Cas 144 (Cir Ct Md 1861).
73 Professor Farber discusses the Merryman case at pp 188-92. concluding (again, with some
hand-wringing and uncertainty) that Lincoln was required to obey Taney's decree. I am one of the
principal opponents in Farber's discussion, having written about the Merryman case and reached
the opposite conclusion on the judicial supremacy point. Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J at 343-45
(cited in note 55) (concluding that although "the Merryman Power is an extraordinary power re-
served for extraordinary occasions," it is "a lawful exercise of executive branch interpretive
power"). The escape hatch Farber offers here is not the same as the one hypothesized for Dred
Scott (that is, that the decision is badly wrong and incoherent on the merits). Instead, Farber
speculates that a president might be permitted to refuse to enforce a judicial decree rendered by
a court that lacked proper jurisdiction (pp 190-91):
[Ihf the court's exercise of judicial power is a clear usurpation of authority over a case that it
has no colorable claim to be hearing, or if the court's claim of jurisdiction invades some criti-
cal constitutional policy, then the president may not be obligated to obey. Regard for checks
and balances should make us reluctant to go much beyond such extraordinary cases. But
when a court acts without jurisdiction at the expense of critical constitutional values, presi-
dential noncompliance coheres with our normal understanding of the binding effects of judi-
cial decrees.
Thus, "[a]rguably, a valid suspension of the writ does eliminate the court's very power to proceed"
(p 191). "Under this analysis, Lincoln's action in Merryman would not stand for any general right
to disobey judicial decrees. It would stand only for a limited right to disobey decrees when the
judge lacked the sheer power to issue a binding order" (p 192).
Farber's distinction does not hold up. In Merryman, the constitutional question was whether
the President had constitutional power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Taney said No. In short, he ruled that he did have jurisdiction. Why shouldn't Lincoln have been
obliged to honor this judicial determination on a question of constitutional law? Either the judici-
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notwithstanding Taney's opinion, that he had legitimate constitutional
power to suspend the writ and that the suspension was necessary to
the defense of the capital. Taney's opinion was wrong, Lincoln be-
lieved, and distinctly harmful to the safety of the nation. Under such
circumstances, Lincoln thought himself not bound even by the judi-
cial decree even in the particular case where rendered, where the ex-
ecutive and military were in effect parties to the case.4
The overriding principle guiding Lincoln's views with respect to
judicial authority seems closely related to his views on state sover-
eignty and the validity of secession: a part cannot be supreme over the
whole, to the injury or destruction of the whole. Just as the peculiar
views of individual states cannot prevail over the sounder views of
the nation as a whole, unsound decisions of the Supreme Court can-
not prevail over the sounder constitutional views of the nation as a
whole. In neither case can an idiosyncratic minority be permitted to
dictate to the majority, to the damage of the nation. If it were other-
wise, "the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to
that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of
that eminent tribunal.""'
Lincoln is, perhaps, slightly disingenuous when he says, in the
next sentence, that there is not, "in this view, any assault upon the
court, or the judges." There is such an assault, and it is almost pre-
cisely parallel to his assault on state supremacy. One can see, from a
distance of nearly a century and a half, that Lincoln was right with re-
spect to the power of state governments-that a part cannot be
permitted to dictate to the whole. We see less clearly that Lincoln was
right with respect to the power of the courts-that judicial supremacy
entails the same fundamental difficulty of permitting one branch of
government to dictate constitutional interpretation to the whole, to
its destruction."
ary's determination of legal questions is binding on the executive or it is not. If it is binding, it
should be binding when the determination involves a legal issue of jurisdiction, just as it should
when the determination involves some other legal issue. If a court's ruling as to its power to pro-
ceed is flagrantly wrong, how is that different from some other exercise of judicial power that is
flagrantly wrong? In both instances, to borrow Farber's words. "the court's exercise of judicial
power is a clear usurpation of authority over a case" (p 190). Why should erroneous decisions as
to jurisdiction or justiciability be treated differently from erroneous decisions that involve ultra
vires exercises of judicial power in some other respect? See Paulsen, 15 Cardozo L Rev at 105
(cited in note 68) ("There is no sound reason to suppose that the President has any greater power
to refuse to execute judgments he thinks erroneous on justiciability grounds than he does to re-
fuse to execute judgments he thinks erroneous on other legal grounds.").
74 See generally Paulsen, 15 Cardozo L Rev 81 (cited in note 68).
75 Lincoln. First InauguralAddress at 221 (cited in note 2).
76 Id.
77 That the two issues converge can be seen by posing a simple hypothetical. If the Taney
Court had held, in an action brought by, say, Virginia against the United States, that secession was
lawful and that Lincoln's constitutional view of Union was wrong, would Lincoln have been
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V. "[M]EASURES, OTHERWISE UNCONSTITUTIONAL..."
The Civil War was a crucible in which was forged important early
answers to persistent, enduring constitutional questions about presi-
dential power, military power, military tribunals, and individual rights.
It was also the crucible in which was forged Lincoln's most contro-
versial constitutional theory: that the law of necessity is an operative
principle of the Constitution, governing how specific provisions of the
document are to be understood, how they apply in time of war or
emergency, and even whether they apply at all. Must specific constitu-
tional provisions sometimes yield to the necessity of preserving the
nation? Lincoln's view was that the Constitution itself so required. "I
felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful,
by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution,
through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed
this ground, and now avow it.''7
It is fashionable, at least in academia, to say that Lincoln was
wrong: it is utterly wrong, and destructive of the constitutional order,
to violate the Constitution on the pretext that doing so is justified in
order to save the Constitution. That is the burden of Farber's chap-
ters on Lincoln's violations of individual rights (Chapter 7) and on
"The Rule of Law in Dark Times" (Chapter 8). Farber makes a con-
vincing case for how deeply problematic Lincoln's views and actions
were. Once again, however, there is a convincing case for siding with
President Lincoln against Professor Farber. The position is full of dif-
ficulties as a practical matter, and is unquestionably dangerous in the
wrong hands, but Lincoln's logic of constitutional priority is, in prin-
ciple, flawless. A part cannot control the whole, to the destruction of
the whole. Just as states may not dictate to the Union, to the destruc-
tion of the Union; and just as courts may not dictate to the nation on
constitutional interpretation, to the destruction of the Constitution;
so too, specific provisions of the Constitution must be interpreted in
light of the need to preserve the constitutional order as a whole, lest
interpretation or enforcement of a particular provision be permitted
to destroy the Constitution as a whole. As a matter of constitutional
law, the Constitution is not a suicide pact. Its provisions should not
be interpreted in such a way as to make it one.
obliged to honor the decree, vacate the White House, and remove the capital to some point north
of the Mason-Dixon line? Farber's bottom line appears to be that, as long as the Court had juris-
diction, the answer is Yes.
78 Abraham Lincoln, To Albert G. Hodges (Apr 4. 1864), in Fehrenbacher, ed, Speeches and
Writings, 1859-1865 585.585 (cited in note 2).
79 For further development of the ideas in this section, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L Rev (forthcoming 2004).
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They need not be. For Abraham Lincoln, the first duty of the
President of the United States was, in the words of the Constitution's
presidential oath of office, to "preserve, protect and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States""' by preserving the nation-the fun-
damental constitutional order-created by that Constitution. The ne-
cessity of preserving the nation was the first obligation of faithfulness
to the Constitution. The specifics of the Constitution might have to
bend so that the nation created by that Constitution
might not break.
Lincoln's understanding of the obligation created by the presi-
dential oath, and the duty it imposes to "preserve, protect and de-
fend" not only a Constitution, but the United States of America, is
key to understanding much of what he did as President. As noted
above, Lincoln fought the Civil War out of a sense of constitutional
obligation-a duty to preserve the nation and his Office and to pass
along both, unimpaired, to a successor. Because secession violated,
according to Lincoln, the most basic principles of the Constitution
and of elected government, it became his sworn constitutional duty,
as chief executive, to suppress such unlawful insurrections and en-
force the Constitution and laws of the United States. "You have no
oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while I shall
have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect and defend' it," Lin-
coln warned the South in the First Inaugural. ' He thus shifted the
burden to the South: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow country-
men, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war.""
The South chose. And the war came. Lincoln's understanding of
his constitutional duty then became that he must win the war in order
to preserve, protect, and defend the Union. This required him-
constitutionally required him-to do what was necessary to win, even
if it meant the temporary sacrifice, during wartime, of other constitu-
tional values. The duty to preserve the nation supplied an overarching
rule of presidential constitutional interpretation: specific provisions
of the Constitution should not be read so as to defeat the fundamen-
tal purpose and goals of the Constitution or to risk the destruction of
the nation. The need to preserve the constitutional order thus oper-
ates as a rule of construction for other constitutional provisions.
That was the essence of Lincoln's legal argument for unilateral
presidential power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus in 1861,
and to defy Chief Justice Taney's order purporting to invalidate the
suspension, in the case of Ex parte Merryman. Lincoln had suspended
80 USConstArt II.§ 1,cl8.
81 Lincoln, First InauguralAddress at 224 (cited in note 2).
82 Idat223.
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the writ on his own, thinking it necessary to enable Union troops to
traverse unfriendly border-state cities in order to save the capital, and
the nation, from falling to the rebellion. Chief Justice Taney, enter-
taining a petition for habeas corpus, held that the writ suspension
power was Congress's alone, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the location of the Constitution's limitation on suspension of
the writ in Article I, Section 9 (immediately following the itemization
of Congress's legislative powers), and the writ's historical origin and
purpose as a limitation on the exercise of arbitrary power by the
executive."
Under ordinary circumstances, Taney might have had the better
of the argument (though even then not by an overwhelming margin).
But under the actual circumstances, Lincoln's position was compel-
ling and sensible. He started, famously, with the constitutional im-
perative of national survival and his oath as President:
To state the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to
go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that
one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath
be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was
believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve
it?"
The interpretive principle of necessity-that the Constitution
should not be construed in a self-destructive manner-then informed
Lincoln's reading of the writ suspension clause: "It was not believed
that any law was violated," Lincoln wrote." The writ suspension
clause was tantamount to authorization to suspend the writ when, in
cases of rebellion, public safety requires it; the Constitution does not
explicitly say who is to exercise the power; the provision was "plainly
made for a dangerous emergency"; and "it cannot be believed the
framers of the instrument intended, that in every case, the danger
should run its course, until Congress could be called together; the
very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this
case, by the rebellion.""'
It was similarly the principle of constitutional necessity-the im-
perative of winning the war and preserving the Union-that led Lin-
coln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation freeing the slaves in the
South. Lincoln did not think the Proclamation within his power sim-
ply because of the immorality of slavery. It was, rather, a war measure
that would not have been constitutionally justified in peacetime. It
83 Exparte Merryman, 17 F Cas at 148-53.
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was, quite literally, the seizure and confiscation of enemy "property"
in order to demoralize the enemy and starve it of resources, so as to
help defeat it. The Proclamation did not apply-could not apply, in
Lincoln's constitutional understanding-in loyal Union states that
sanctioned slavery.
Lincoln's best explanation of his actions, with respect to emanci-
pation specifically, and with respect to the conduct of the war gener-
ally, came in a public letter to Senator Albert G. Hodges of Kentucky,
recounting remarks he had made in a private meeting with the Sena-
tor and others. The letter, near the end of Lincoln's first term, and
barely a year before his death, captures Lincoln's constitutional phi-
losophy quite well. I have already quoted a fragment, but the entire
passage merits quotation:
I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is
wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think, and feel.
And yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred
upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judg-
ment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would, to the
best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States. I could not take the office without taking
the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get
power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too,
that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me
to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the
moral question of slavery.... I did understand however, that my
oath to preserve the constitution to the best of my ability, im-
posed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable
means, that government-that nation-of which that constitu-
tion was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and
yet preserve the constitution? By general law life and limb must
be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;
but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that meas-
ures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by be-
coming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution,
through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I as-
sumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the
best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the constitution,
if, to save slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the
wreck of government, country, and Constitution all together."
It's all there: oath, duty, and necessity. (And, by implication, Lin-
coln's views of slavery, of Union, and of judicial authority.) The con-
87 Lincoln, To Hodges at 585 (cited in note 78).
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stitutional requirement of the oath obligated Lincoln to defend the
Constitution as he understood it, including his understanding of the
perpetuity of the Union and the attendant presidential duty to main-
tain that Union and execute the laws in every state thereof. That duty
was personal. He could not resign it into the hands of the Supreme
Court, nor could he yield to force or threats of force by the states in
rebellion. He was bound by that duty even when it ran contrary to his
strong personal views.
But that duty also supplied a constitutional imperative, and a
template, for how all other constitutional provisions must be inter-
preted and applied. Lincoln did not believe that circumstances might
justify violating the Constitution; he believed that the Constitution it-
self supplied a meta-interpretive principle of necessity, justifying-
constitutionally justifying -subordination, temporarily, of specific
provisions: "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might be-
come lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the
constitution, through the preservation of the nation."
Lincoln followed this principle of constitutional necessity relent-
lessly and, it must be conceded, sometimes erred in his application of
it-or at least so it seems, with the aid of nearly a century and a half
of hindsight. Farber documents actions of Lincoln (and his generals)
that most observers today would regard as violations of the freedom
of speech and the due process rights to trial by civilian courts and by
jury.
But is it really so easy to conclude that Lincoln's actions were
unconstitutional, even in these instances, if Lincoln's assessment at
the time was correct, that such actions were, in the main, justified by
the necessity of preserving the Constitution by first preserving the na-
tion constituted by that document? Even modern legal doctrine has
generated myriad "compelling interest" tests in which courts have dis-
covered exceptions, implied out of necessity and practicality, from
seemingly absolute constitutional provisions.
Professor Farber is fair and balanced in his assessment of Lin-
coln's record concerning individual liberties, resisting the temptation
to be too harshly critical. But is there not something deficient in a
constitutional analysis that sees mostly trees and not much forest? In
this respect, one can see Lincoln's greatness not only as a practical
88 The Supreme Court's cases are loaded with "compelling state interest" exceptions or
tests in the areas of freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, equal protection, and due process
of law. A Westlaw search for "compelling interest" (somewhat overinclusive and also somewhat
underinclusive) produced 272 documents in the Supreme Court database. Some such cases are
convincing in theory and in practice, some are convincing in theory but not in how they are ap-
plied. and some are unconvincing both in theory and in application. People differ as to which cases
fall in which categories.
2004]
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leader, but also as a constitutional theorist, operating at a level a
notch higher yet even than the most brilliant legal scholars of a cen-
tury and a half later. Lincoln's logic is relentless and powerful, as well
as practical; his judgment that the part must yield to the whole-an
insight common to Lincoln's view of the Union, to his view of judicial
authority, and to his view of constitutional survival and necessity as a
meta-principle of constitutional interpretation-is deductive reason-
ing at its best. Specific provisions of the Constitution must be inter-
preted and applied in light of the imperative of preserving the Con-
stitution as a whole, through preservation of the nation. The argu-
ment can misfire in its application-Presidents can be mistaken as to
how it applies in particular situations; " the Supreme Court likewise
can be mistaken as to what is a "compelling interest" justifying meas-
ures otherwise unconstitutional! ' The argument is dangerous. Its ap-
plications will almost always be contestable. But can one really say
that the logic of the argument is wrong?
CONCLUSION
If the Civil War must be judged the most important event of con-
stitutional interpretation in our nation's history, Lincoln must be
judged the most important, influential constitutional interpreter and
expositor our nation has ever known-beating out, by a fair distance,
his next nearest rivals, Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, James
Madison, William Brennan, and Earl Warren. On the question of Un-
ion and sovereignty-arguably the most fundamental contested ques-
tion of constitutional structure -our view of the Constitution is Lin-
coln's more than anyone else's, and flows from Lincoln's actions and
resolve more than anyone else's. On the question of presidential
power, our view of the Constitution flows from Lincoln's maximiza-
tion of the constitutional powers of the office, at a time when circum-
stances required their use, more than from any other President's ac-
tions and far more than from any judicial decision. Our view of presi-
dential duty to the nation comes (probably without our understand-
ing of its source) from Lincoln, too. Even where Lincoln's views were
derivative from those of others, it is Lincoln who expressed them best
and made them, truly, the law of the land.
89 Witness President Harry Truman's actions in seizing the nation's steel mills in 1952, lead-
ing to the Court's decision in Youngstown, 343 US 579.
90 Witness the Court's ratification of the actions of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Congress in interning Japanese-Americans during World War II. See Korematsu v United States,
323 US 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81 (1943). But see Patrick Gudridge, Re-
member Endo?, 116 Harv L Rev 1933 (2003) (attempting to resuscitate Endo, the neglected com-
panion case to Korematsu that held the relocation camps to be unlawful).
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On other issues, Lincoln's interpretations of the Constitution do
not currently prevail (judicial supremacy being a prominent exam-
ple). But even on these, Lincoln's views are powerful and usually
stand as a powerful intellectual critique of views more widely held
today. One can only hope that Professor Farber's book will begin a
rekindling of interest in the most seriously neglected constitutional
scholar and theorist of all time. For, in the main, Lincoln's Constitu-
tion is the Constitution we have today; and where it is not, it ought to
be.
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